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Who’s Your Debt Collector Now? Extending Debt
Collection Regulation to First-Party Lenders
I. INTRODUCTION
Freedom Stores, also known as Freedom Furniture, is in
trouble. According to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(“CFPB”), the company improperly filed lawsuits to collect consumer
debt in states in which the consumers neither lived nor signed the loan
agreement.2 Additionally, Freedom Stores continued to withdraw funds
from consumer accounts, even though consumers had only authorized a
one-time withdrawal to make debt payments.3 Freedom Stores, together
with Freedom Acceptance Corp. and Military Credit Services, agreed to
refund over $2 million in consumer debt it collected and to pay serious
fines pursuant to a consent order with the CFPB.4 Freedom Stores is
not the only first-party lender in trouble. The “buy here pay here”5 car
seller, DriveTime, recently entered into a consent order with the CFPB
over abusive debt collection practices.6 The alleged practices included
harassing phone calls to consumers’ workplaces, which in at least one
instance led to a consumer being fired.7 DriveTime’s in-house debt
collectors routinely ignored Do Not Call (“DNC”) requests where
consumers requested that the collector stop calling them at their
workplace8 and continued calling and harassing third parties, even after
1

1. Mitch Lipka, The CFPB Wins a Battle for Military Members, CBS, (Dec. 18, 2014,
4:13 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/military-members-to-recover-2-5-million-in-debtcollection-settlement/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. “Buy here pay here” is a term that describes car dealers that both sell cars and
service automobile loans. See, e.g., Russ Heaps, What Is Buy Here Pay Here,
AUTOTRADER.COM (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.autotrader.com/research/article/carshopping/229244/what-is-buy-here-pay-here.jsp.
6. DriveTime Automotive Grp., Inc. & DT Acceptance Corp., 2014 CFPBCO 0017
(2014).
7. Id. at 5.
8. Id.
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being told they had reached a wrong number.9
Despite these questionable practices, the recent interest in
enforcing regulation against first-party lenders has left many in the
industry surprised and wary.10 While debt collection by third-party debt
collectors has been a consistent concern for regulatory agencies,11 debt
collection by first-party lenders has received far less attention.12
Following the 2008 financial crisis, however, Congress passed new
statutes authorizing additional regulation and oversight for financial
service providers.13 Most notable was the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”), which
charged the newly-created CFPB with regulating the debt collection
industry.14 The CFPB does so primarily by creating rules and
regulations in accordance with provisions of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (“FDCPA”),15 which sets guidelines for debt collection
practices of third-party debt collectors.16 Dodd-Frank also includes its
own regulations for debt collection, including a prohibition on “unfair,
deceptive, and abusive [acts or] practices,” (“UDAAPs”) by any
financial service provider.17
Despite existing protections and changes in regulation,
significant consumer concerns related to debt collection persist.18 Since
September 2013, complaints about debt collection exceeded all other
complaints received by the CFPB.19 In response to these complaints,
9. Id. at 6–7.
10. Andy Peters, Banks Fear Crackdown on In-House Debt Collections, AM. BANKER

CONSUMER FIN. (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/consumerfinance/banks-fear-crackdown-on-in-house-debt-collections-1071513-1.html.
11. S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696.
12. Peters, supra note 10.
13. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-881, IMPACT OF THE DODD-FRANK
ACT DEPENDS LARGELY ON FUTURE RULE MAKINGS 1 (Sept. 13, 2012).
14. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) §§
1011, 1012, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491, 5492(10) (2012) (providing that the CFPB should regulate
consumer financial products or services).
15.
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874
(1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012)).
16. FDCPA §802(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012).
17. Dodd Frank § 1031(a)–(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a)–(d). In addition to the FDCPA and
Dodd-Frank, the Federal Trade Commission Act has been protecting consumers from
abusive practices in debt collection since 1938. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed.
Reg. 67848, 67850 (proposed Nov. 12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006).
18. Debt Collection (Regulation F) 78 Fed. Reg. at 67851.
19. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, A SNAPSHOT OF DEBT COLLECTION COMPLAINTS
SUBMITTED BY OLDER CONSUMERS 3 (2014), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov
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the CFPB released an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(“ANPR”) in October 2013, laying out several areas in the debt
collection industry that may see additional regulation.20 The ANPR
primarily seeks regulation of third-party debt collectors.21 Third-party
debt collectors do not originate loans, but have been the primary focus
of previous debt collection regulation.22 The CFPB also suggested
regulation of first-party lenders in debt collection, however, particularly
with respect to unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices.23 This Note
argues that, while the CFPB may have the authority to regulate firstparty lenders, it should not do so in the same way it regulates third-party
debt collectors. The CFPB should continue regulating through
enforcement actions or consider a separate rulemaking for first-party
lenders.
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part II outlines the primary
differences between third-party debt collectors and first-party lenders.24
Part III provides an overview of current regulations of third-party debt
collectors and first-party lenders, specifically relating to UDAAPs.25
Part IV explains the areas in which the ANPR suggests changes in
regulation, particularly as those changes apply to first-party lenders.26
Part V discusses whether regulation of first-party lenders is statutorily
feasible, or even necessary, and addresses some of the practical barriers
to such regulation.27 Part VI concludes by arguing that, while additional
regulation of first-party lenders and their debt collection practices is
possible, the CFPB’s proposed method is not practical because this type
of regulation requires more individualized consideration.28
II. FIRST-PARTY LENDERS AND THIRD-PARTY DEBT COLLECTORS
First-party lenders and third-party debt collectors may appear to
/reports/a-snapshot-of-debt-collection-complaints-submitted-by-older-consumers/.
20. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67848.
21. See, e.g., id. (focusing primarily on regulations under the FDCPA, which do not
extend to first-party lenders).
22. See Peters, supra note 10.
23. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67870.
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See infra Part V.
28. See infra Part VI.
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fulfill similar roles in debt collection, but there are inherent differences
between the two.29 In the context of debt collection, the basic definition
of a first-party lender is a lender, like a bank, that originates a loan and
then collects that same loan itself.30 It may do this through in-house
debt collection or by contracting with outside collectors, who still
collect the debt using the name of the original lender.31 DriveTime, a
company that both sells cars and provides car loans to consumers, is an
example of a first-party lender.32 DriveTime collects any delinquent
loans by contracting with debt collectors that attempt to collect the debt
using DriveTime’s name.33 Bank of America also acts as a first-party
lender when it attempts to collect on the mortgage loans it issues to its
mortgagees.34
Third-party debt collectors, on the other hand, are debt
collectors that do not originate loans but rather collect debts issued by
other institutions using their own name or purchase delinquent accounts
from first-party lenders,35 often for pennies on the dollar.36 Examples of
third-party debt collectors are large collection agencies, such as
Portfolio Recovery Services,37 as well as law firms that specialize in
debt collection under their own name.38
First-party lenders and third-party debt collectors are
significantly different for several reasons.39 First, first-party lenders and

29. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67848, 67849 (proposed Nov. 12,
2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006) (explaining that third-party debt collectors
collect debt for an original creditor, but do not issue their own loans or credit).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. DriveTime Automotive Grp., Inc. & DT Acceptance Corp., 2014 CFPBCO 0017,
at 4 (2014).
33. Id. at 4–5.
34. See Dena Aubin, Bank of America in Record Settlement over ‘Robocall’
(Sept.
30,
2013),
Complaints,
REUTERS
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/30/bankofamerica-robocalls-settleidUSL1N0HQ0HU20130930.
35. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67849.
36. Peter A. Holland, The One Billion Dollar Problem in Small Claims Court: RoboSigning and Lack of Proof in Debt Buyer Cases, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 259, 260 (2011).
37. Al Lewis, Rein in the Debt-Collection Racket, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304885404579550191517738938.
38. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67849.
39. See Comment Letter from Jess Sharp, Managing Dir., U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
to Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau 11–12 (Feb. 28, 2014), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2013-0033-0329.
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third-party debt collectors are regulated differently.40 The FDCPA
exempts first-party lenders from regulation,41 but they are often subject
to a variety of other regulations that do not apply to third-party debt
collectors.42 Second, first-party lenders have a different relationship
with consumers because they depend on consumers choosing their
services.43 Meanwhile, third-party debt collectors only make a profit if
they can collect at least a portion of a delinquent debt and, therefore, use
aggressive collection tactics more frequently.44 Any new regulatory
action should take these differences into account.
III. CURRENT REGULATION OF DEBT COLLECTORS AND FIRST-PARTY
LENDERS
Current regulation already recognizes the differences between
first-party lenders and third-party debt collectors.45 While the Federal
Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”) and Dodd-Frank apply to a broader
category of financial service providers,46 the FDCPA applies
specifically to third-party debt collectors.47
A.

FTCA Regulation

The FTCA was enacted before the FDCPA and Dodd-Frank48
and has historically addressed many consumer concerns related to
credit, lending, and debt collection.49 In particular, section 5 of the
FTCA prohibits “using unfair methods of competition in or affecting
40. See Comment Letter from Denise Nixon, Int’l Bancshares Corp., to Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bureau 2 (Feb. 25, 2014), available at http://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2013-0033-0229.
41. S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1698.
42. See Nixon, supra note 40.
43. See id. at 3.
44. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67849.
45. See, e.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) § 803(6), 15 U.S.C. §
1692a(6) (specifically excluding first-party lenders from regulation).
46. See Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) § 5(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012)
(applying to any party engaged in commerce); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) § 1002(6), 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (2012) (applying to
any financial service provider).
47. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67849.
48. Kathlyn L. Farrell, Managing UDAAP Compliance Risks in Financial Institutions,
27 J. TAX’N FIN. INST. 21, 21 (Nov./Dec. 2013).
49. See Debt Collection (Regulation F) 78 Fed. Reg. at 67851 n.16.
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commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.”50 A practice is “unfair” if it “causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition.”51 The FTCA served as the primary
means of consumer protection from deceptive or unfair debt collection
from 1938 until Congress passed the FDCPA in 1977.52 Today, the
FTCA still plays a key role in protecting consumers from deceptive or
unfair debt collection practices.53
B.

FDCPA Regulations

The FDCPA seeks to protect consumers from improper debt
collection by “eliminate[ing] abusive debt collection practices by debt
collectors.”54 The FDCPA also aims to prevent those third-party debt
collectors that do not employ abusive practices from being
“competitively disadvantaged” because of regulation.55 Congress hoped
for consistency in state actions by creating some minimal consumer
protections from abusive debt collection by third-party debt collectors.56
The FDCPA is limited and excludes first-party lenders from regulation,
unless they are collecting under a name that is not their own.57 The
FDCPA specifies a variety of rules and limitations on only third-party
50. FTCA § 5(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
51. FTCA § 5(n), 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). The FTC has since specified that the injury to a

consumer must be substantial, that it “must not be outweighed by any offsetting consumer
or competitive benefits” and that the consumer could not have reasonably avoided it.
International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1073–74 (1984).
52. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67850.
53. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n,, FTC Takes Action to Stop Phantom
Debt Scam That Targeted Spanish-Speaking Consumers Nationwide (Oct. 23, 2014),
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/10/ftc-takes-action-stop-phantom-debtscam-targeted-spanish-speaking (describing an action taken by the FTC against a debt
collector who was threatening consumers with arrest and “immigration status
investigation”).
54. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) § 802, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012).
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See FDCPA § 803(6), 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (listing which parties are considered
debt collectors, and thus subject to the FDCPA). The Senate report on the FDCPA
specifically excludes creditors that collect under their “true” name, presumably because it is
only when the consumer is aware of the first-party lender relationship that the consumer can
benefit from different relationship with a first-party lender as opposed to a third party debt
collector. See S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1698.
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debt collectors, such as limits on communication with third parties and
with consumers.58
An important provision of the FDCPA addresses harassment,
abuse, false or misleading representation, and unfair practices.59 The
FDCPA prohibits third-party debt collectors from engaging “in any
conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse
any person in connection with the collection of a debt.”60 The FDCPA
provides some examples of abusive or harassing conduct.61 This
conduct includes: threatening violence or other types of harm; using
obscenities in communications; threatening to publish a list of all
persons who refuse to pay a debt; advertising a debt to force a consumer
to pay that debt; calling with sufficient frequency to rise to the level of
harassment; and, except to gather location information, calling without
providing the debt collectors identity.62
In addition, third-party debt collectors may not “use any false,
deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with
the collection of any debt.”63 For instance, third-party debt collectors
may not impersonate an attorney, pretend to be related to a government
entity, or misrepresent the “character, amount, or legal status” of a debt
or a payment on a debt.64 Third-party debt collectors are also prohibited
from providing consumers with deceptive forms that would lead the
consumer to believe that a different party was collecting the debt.65
Further, third-party debt collectors may not “use unfair or
unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect” a debt.66 For
example, attempting collection of an amount greater than that expressed
58. FDCPA § 804, 15 U.S.C. § 1692b.
59. FDCPA § 807, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
60. FDCPA § 806, 15 U.S.C. § 1692d.
61. FDCPA § 806(1)–(6), 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(1)–(6).
62. Id.
63. FDCPA § 807, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
64. FDCPA § 807(1)–(5), 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1)–(5) (providing additional examples of

deceptive means, such as threatening arrest or imprisonment for nonpayment of debt,
threatening wage garnishment, or generally threatening debtor with anything that cannot
legally be done, implicating that a crime has been committed, communicating false
information related to credit information, making a document that appears to be authorized
or created by a government entity, failing to use mini-Miranda warning when initially
communicating with debtor, pretending documents are a legal process, or are not a legal
process and do not require action when they are, or pretending to be a consumer reporting
agency).
65. FDCPA § 812, 15 U.S.C. § 1692j.
66. FDCPA § 808, 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.
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in the agreement between the debt collector and the consumer is
considered unfair and unconscionable.67
Consumers have successfully invoked the FDCPA to protect
themselves from abusive third-party debt collectors.68 In Crossley v.
Lieberman,69 a sixty-eight year old widow received a letter informing
her that legal action would commence against her within a week if she
did not pay her $297.79 debt. The third-party debt collector threatened
a foreclosure action against the widow if she did not pay her debt, even
though the action would have been barred under the applicable
Pennsylvania statute.70 When she called the debt collector to tell him
she could not pay, he advised her to sell her house and become a “bag
lady.”71 After cashing in her pension to pay her debt, the widow sued
the debt collector.72 Ultimately, she prevailed by asserting that the debt
collector could not use deceptive means to collect a debt, which
includes threatening to take barred legal action.73
Congress “carefully considered” extending the provisions of the
FDCPA to include first-party lenders when it passed the FDCPA, but
decided against such an extension.74 Pitner v. Northland Group &
Capital One Services LLC75 exemplifies the exclusion of first-party
lenders under the FDCPA. The U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against Capital
One, because the plaintiffs failed to establish that the FDCPA applied to
a first-party lender, such as Capital One.76 Thus, while the FDCPA
provides extensive consumer protection against third-party debt
collectors, consumers are dependent on Dodd-Frank for protection
67. FDCPA § 808(1)–(3), (7), 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1)–(3), (7) (providing further
examples, like depositing checks more than five days after they are dated, unless the debtor
is informed, encouraging consumers to send postdated checks and using those checks to
threaten the debtor, or communicating with a debtor about a debt through a postcard).
68. See, e.g., Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 570–71 (3d Cir. 1989).
69. Id. at 567–68.
70. Id. at 570–71.
71. Id. at 567–68.
72. Id. at 568.
73. Id. at 570–71.
74. See Comment Letter from Virginia O’Neil, Am. Bankers Ass’n, Dong Hong,
Consumer Bankers Ass’n, and Anne Wallace, Fin. Servs. Roundtable, to Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bureau 36 (Feb. 28, 2014), available at http://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2013-0033-032.
75. Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Pitner v. Northland Grp., Inc. &
Capital One Servs. LLC, 2012 WL 254035, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 26, 2012).
76. Id.
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against first-party lenders.77
C.

Dodd-Frank Regulation of Debt Collectors and First-Party
Lenders

Dodd-Frank applies to a broader category of financial service
providers than does the FDCPA, including first-party lenders.78 DoddFrank covers any entity that provides a “consumer financial product or
service” and anyone acting as a service provider to such an entity.79
Consumer financial services include “extending credit and servicing
loans” and selling or buying loans, except for the purpose of “extending
commercial credit to a person who originates consumer credit
transactions.”80 Also included in the definition of consumer financial
services is “collecting debt related to any consumer financial product or
service.”81 Regulation under Dodd-Frank extends to any nondepository party that the CFPB determines “is engaging, or has
engaged, in conduct that poses risks to consumers with regard to the
offering or provision of consumer financial products or services.”82
Dodd-Frank also requires financial service providers to comply with
state debt collection laws,83 which may provide greater protection for
consumers.84
Dodd-Frank gives the CFPB rulemaking authority to implement
the consumer protection provisions of the law.85 While making these
rules, the CFPB is required to consider costs and benefits to consumers
and to the financial industry.86 In addition to rulemaking, the CFPB
77. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67848, 67851–52 (proposed Nov.
12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006).
78. Id. at 67852.
79. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) §
1002(6), 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (2012).
80. Dodd-Frank § 1002(15)(A)(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5481(15)(A)(i) (including several other
services and products that are not relevant for the purpose here).
81. Dodd-Frank § 1002(15)(A)(x), 12 U.S.C. § 5481(15)(A)(x).
82. Dodd-Frank § 1024(a)(1)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)C).
83. Dodd-Frank § 1041, 12 U.S.C. § 5551.
84. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Alfred Ripley, N.C. Justice Ctr., to Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bureau 3 (Feb. 28, 2014), available at http://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2013-0033-0355 (explaining that North Carolina consumer
protection law prohibits, for example the collection of a time barred debt).
85. Dodd-Frank § 1021(c)(5), 12 U.S.C. § 5511(c)(5) (establishing several other
research and data collection functions).
86. Dodd-Frank § 1022(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii), 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).
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monitors activities in the financial services industry and actively
participates in protecting consumers from unexpected risks, especially
related to new trends.87 The CFPB mandates disclosures and consumer
access to information so that consumers may understand the “costs,
benefits, and risks associated with the [financial] product or service.”88
The CFPB is further tasked with preventing UDAAPs.89
Dodd-Frank provides some guidance as to what qualifies as a
UDAAP.90 The Dodd-Frank definition of an “unfair” practice was
adopted from the FTCA and is nearly identical.91 Dodd-Frank does not
further define “deceptive” practices, instead, its meaning has been
developed through agency enforcement actions and publications.92
Both deceptive and unfair practice prohibitions appear in the FTCA and
have been defined in that context through the judicial process and
enforcement actions.93 The CFPB relies on those actions to inform its

87. Dodd-Frank § 1022(c)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(1). For example, the CFPB has
been monitoring the changes in debt collection practices with the rise of new technologies.
Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67848, 67853 (proposed Nov. 12, 2013) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006).
88. Dodd-Frank § 1032(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5532(a).
89. Dodd-Frank § 1031(a)–(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a)–(d). Additionally, financial service
providers are prohibited from providing illegal services. Dodd-Frank § 1036(a)(1)(A), 12
U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(A).
90. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank § 1031(c)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1) (providing guidance on
“unfair” practices).
91. Dodd-Frank § 1031(c)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1) (stating that a practice is unfair if
“the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not
reasonably avoidable by consumers; and . . . such substantial injury is not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition”); Federal Trade Commission Act
(“FTCA”) § 5(n), 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012) (stating that a practice is “unfair” if it “causes or
is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition”).
92. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULL. No. 2013-07, PROHIBITION
OF UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE, OR ABUSIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES IN THE COLLECTION OF CONSUMER
DEBTS 3–4 (2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201307_cfpb_bulletin_unfairdeceptive-abusive-practices.pdf [hereinafter BULLETIN]. The CFPB has, however, defined
deceptive conduct in its examination manual, stating that practices are deceptive if “(1) The
representation, omission, act, or practice misleads or is likely to mislead the consumer;
(2) The consumer’s interpretation of the representation, omission, act, or practice is
reasonable under the circumstances; and (3) The misleading representation, omission, act, or
practice is material.”
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND
EXAMINATION MANUAL V.2, STATUTORY-AND REGULATION-BASED PROCEDURE, UNFAIR,
OR
ABUSIVE
ACTS
OR
PRACTICES
5
(Oct.
2012),
DECEPTIVE,
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_supervision-and-examination-manualv2.pdf [hereinafter MANUAL].
93. See Farrell, supra note 48, at 21–22.
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understanding of unfair and deceptive practices.94 “Abusive” practices,
however, represent a new concept introduced by Dodd-Frank.95 A
practice qualifies as abusive if it “materially interferes with the ability
of a consumer to understand a term or condition of a consumer financial
product or service” or if it “takes unreasonable advantage” of “lack of
understanding . . . the inability of the consumer to protect the interest of
the consumer [and] . . . the reasonable reliance by consumer on covered
person to act in the interest of the consumer.”96 Because “abusive
practice” prohibitions are relatively new, comprehensive interpretations
of the term remain limited.97
IV. AREAS OF PROPOSED REGULATION
Consumers and consumer advocacy groups have concerns about
the current state of non-compliance of many third-party debt collectors
and first-party lenders.98 While the most frequent consumer complaint
is abusive communication,99 consumers also express concern over
misrepresentation about the amount of debt they owe and the legal
status of such debt.100 In light of technological advances, both
consumers and debt collectors are left without guidance about what is
considered abusive, unfair or deceptive.101
In its ANPR on debt collection, the CFPB proposes regulation
94.

See, e.g., BULLETIN, supra note 89, at 2 n.8; see also MANUAL, supra note 92, at 1

n.2.
95. Farrell, supra note 48, at 28.
96. Dodd-Frank § 1031(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d).
97. See Farrell, supra note 48, at 28. In a recent enforcement action, the CFPB found

that creating a false sense of urgency in attempting to collect a debt which led consumers to
borrow more money from a payday lender was abusive, since it took unreasonable
advantage of the consumers’ inability to protect their own interest. ACE Cash Express, Inc.,
2014 CFPBCO 0008, at 10–11 (2014).
98. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB ORDERS SUBPRIME CREDIT CARD
COMPANY TO REFUND $2.7 MILLION FOR CHARGING ILLEGAL CREDIT CARD FEES (Feb. 4,
2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-orders-subprime-credit-cardcompany-to-refund-2-7-million-for-charging-illegal-credit-card-fees/ (explaining that the
CFPB ordered a subprime credit card company to refund money to consumers for illegal
credit card charges).
99. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67848, 67863 (proposed Nov. 12,
2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006) (stating that abusive communications include
“multiple calls from debt collector in a pattern that seemed to them to be harassment”).
100. Lewis, supra note 37.
101. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67870–72 (stating that more
rules could provide more clarity, and describing some of the concerns that arise with the use
of new technology).
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that touches upon a variety of different aspects of debt collection,
including information disclosures upon the sale or transfer of a debt,
validation notices and debt disputes, communications with consumers
and third parties, abusive, deceptive and unfair practices, litigation
practices, and time-barred debt.102 Through new rules, CFPB may also
provide a clearer definition of service providers and service provider
liability.103 Significantly, the CFPB explicitly mentions regulation of
unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices by first-party lenders.104 This is
particularly surprising due to the previous dearth regarding regulation of
first-party lenders and their debt collection practices.105 The CFPB’s
suggestion of first-party regulation surprised many first-party lenders
because the UDAAP provisions of Dodd-Frank were typically defined
by enforcement actions or in reliance on the FTCA and because the
CFPB gave no indication that it was planning to regulate this area of
debt collection.106 Still, the CFPB may now implement more specific
regulatory definitions for first-party lenders that are similar, or identical,
to those for third-party debt collectors under the FDCPA.107
A.

Unfair, Deceptive, and Abusive Practices

The CFPB is considering more detailed standards relating to
unfair, deceptive, and abusive debt collection to make compliance easier
for any party collecting a debt.108 In doing so, the CFPB may prohibit
first-party lenders from engaging in practices that, until now, were only
prohibited for third-party debt collectors under the FDCPA.109 The
CFPB could accomplish this by finding that practices that are abusive
and prohibited under the FDCPA are also prohibited by Dodd-Frank’s
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 67848.
Id. at 67874–75.
See id. at 67870–73.
See Peters, supra note 10, at 2.
See Farrell, supra note 48, at 28 (stating that “no one can be sure” how the abusive
acts definition will be shaped by the CFPB).
107. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67870–74 (questioning, for
example, whether the CFPB should “include in proposed rules prohibitions on first-party
debt collectors engaging in the same conduct that such rules would bar as unfair or
unconscionable by third-party debt collectors”).
108. Id. at 67870.
109. See id. (questioning, for example, whether the CFPB should “include in proposed
rules prohibitions on first-party debt collectors engaging in the same conduct that such rules
would bar as abusive conduct by third-party debt collectors”).
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UDAAP provisions.110
This symmetry would create uniform
expectations and prohibitions related to abusive practices for any party
attempting to collect a debt, including first-party lenders.111 For
example, loan agreements for service members often include permission
for a first-party lender to contact the commanding officer of the
consumer about the loan.112 The FDCPA limits the way in which thirdparty debt collectors communicate with commanding officers.113
However, less clarity remains if the collector of the debt is a first-party
lender, since little guidance exists on how the CFPB will apply the
provisions of abusive practices under Dodd-Frank.114 While more
clarity would be beneficial here, it could also be achieved through
individual enforcement actions instead of through broad regulation.
In the ANPR, the CFPB also addresses possible regulation of
deceptive conduct related to first-party lenders.115 First-party lenders
could benefit from a clearer definition of deceptive practices, since they
would have more guidance for their own conduct.116 The current
definition of deceptive practices is based on the FTCA definition of the
term, which has been shaped by years of enforcement actions.117 The
CFPB could expedite addressing deceptive conduct by creating a
uniform and expanded definition, particularly as it arises in the use of
new technology—including novel communication media such as email
or social media—which has implications for the mini-Miranda
requirement,118 electronic payment methods, and fee disclosures.119
Id.
See id. (“Greater clarity and specificity as to prohibited conduct could make it
easier for collectors and others to know what they must do to comply with the law. Rules
that provide greater clarity and specificity as to prohibited conduct also could simplify law
enforcement actions against those who do not comply.”)
112. Id. at 67866.
113. Id. (finding that such communications will be limited under the FDCPA if they are
“inconvenient, annoying, or harassing, or may harm their reputations at work”).
114. See Farrell, supra note 48, at 28.
115. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67871.
116. See id. at 67870.
117. Farrell, supra note 48, at 21.
118. The Mini-Miranda warning is the requirement that debt collectors disclose that they
are debt collectors or that they are attempting to collect a debt when they communicate with
consumers. TRACY A. KENNEDY, ZIMNEY FOSTER P.C., FEDERAL FAIR DEBT COLLECTION
PRACTICES ACT—FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF THIRD PARTY DEBT
COLLECTORS (COLLECTION AGENCIES AND LAWYERS) WHO COLLECT “CONSUMER” DEBTS
FOR
CREDITORS,
http://www.sband.org/userfiles/files/pdfs/seminar_pdfs/materials/
materials_kennedy_collectionpracticeact.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2014).
119. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67872–73 (discussing, for
110.
111.

332

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 19

Such improvements could prevent, for example, mini-Miranda warning
violations, which occur when a party attempting to collect a debt
“friends” a consumer on social media sites, without disclosing who they
are or what they are doing.120 However, additional regulation of
communications could make it more difficult for first-party lenders to
communicate with consumers.121 While third-party debt collectors
contact consumers solely for the purpose of collecting a debt and have
no incentive to refrain from deceptive actions apart from regulation,
first-party debt collectors have both a reputation and relationships with
consumers at stake.122 Additional regulation would be expensive for
first-party lenders and could even prevent consumers from
communicating with a lender in a preferred manner.123
The CFPB may also expand the definition of unfair practices,
and apply concrete examples of unfair practices found in the FDCPA to
first-party lenders.124 As with deceptive practices, the FTCA standard
of unfair practices informs the Dodd-Frank interpretation of the term.125
A definitional expansion could affect new communication technologies,
which raises concerns because of the potential consumer costs of
receiving text messages and calls on cell phones.126 Because of possible
expenses to consumers, the CFPB is contemplating requiring consumer
permission for communication through certain forms of media.127 Many
first-party lenders offer services to consumers that take advantage of
new communication technology, for example text messaging.128 If the
example, how to avoid disclosure to third parties, while including Mini-Miranda warnings in
communications via text message or email).
120. Eliberty Lopez, Debt Collectors Disguised as Facebook “Friends”: Solutions to
Prevent Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act on Social Media Platforms, 65
RUTGERS L. REV. 923, 930–31 (2013).
121. O’Neil et al., supra note 74, at 6.
122. Id. at 4–5.
123. See Comment Letter from Marsha Reeves, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, PayPal, to
Consumer
Fin.
Prot.
Bureau
3–4
(Feb.
28,
2014),
available
at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2013-0033-0340 (explaining that
many consumers want to use new technology in their communications, and that allowing
consumers to limit the media by which they would be contacted would place a burden on
debt collectors).
124. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67873.
125. Id.; see also BULLETIN, supra note 92, at 1 n.1.
126. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67873.
127. See id. at 67873–74 (requesting comments on whether consumers should be
required to consent to any communicating from a debt collector if it could result in an
expense for the consumer, for example text messaging).
128. See,
e.g.,
Text
Banking,
BANK
OF
AM.
(Jan.
6,
2014),
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CFPB imposes regulation on some of those services, it would not only
create expenses for first-party lenders, it could also inconvenience
consumers.129
Upon finalization of the regulation, several additional potential
regulations intended to prevent unfair practices would apply to thirdparty debt collectors and possibly to first-party lenders.130 The
regulations are related to payment practices, substantiation, and thirdparty liability.131 The CFPB may clarify payment standards, for
example, allowing consumers to specify how payments should be
applied if a consumer owes multiple debts and attempts to pay only one
of them, and requiring the party to whom the payment is made to issue
receipts.132 The CFPB has also expressed interest in implementing
regulations that would require a party collecting a debt to substantiate
information before making a legal claim on the debt to make sure that
they have sufficient evidence to move forward in court.133 The CFPB
may identify what type of substantiation should be required at what
stage in the debt collection process,134 and could adopt substantiation
requirements included in the FTCA, under which some types of
unsubstantiated claims are unfair and deceptive.135 However, these
substantiation requirements would be superfluous for first-party
lenders.136 First-party lenders are the originators of a debt, and it would
seem pointless to require them to explain the origin of the loans to
consumers when they have not been sold to another party.137

https://www.bankofamerica.com/online-banking/text-banking.go (allowing consumers to
check their balance or recent transactions by text message).
129. Comment Letter from William Wallace, Chief Operations Officer, JPMorgan
Chase & Co., to Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau 3–4 (Feb. 28, 2014), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2013-0033-0304 (explaining that
immediate communication with consumers is often in the consumers best interest).
130. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67874.
131. Id.
132. See id. (questioning whether these additional safeguards may be necessary in light
of some debt collector practices).
133. Id.
134. See id. (requesting information from consumers and industry about what
information should be substantiated at what stage in litigation or debt collection).
135. Id. at 67873. The FTCA prohibits the use of “unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”
Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”) § 5(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(2) (2012).
136. O’Neil et al., supra note 74, at 5 (discussing information that needs to be included
in validation notices, which is used to substantiate the accuracy of a debt).
137. Id.
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Service Providers

Finally, the CFPB may propose two clarifications related to
service providers.138 First, clarity regarding which entities are
considered service providers, and second, the extent to which a service
provider’s liability for UDAAP violations extends to a covered party.139
Dodd-Frank defines service providers as “any person that provides a
material service to a covered person in connection with the offering or
provision by such covered person of a consumer financial product or
service.”140 Covered parties include first-party lenders.141 However, the
reach of the definition of service providers remains unclear.142 For
example, is a cell phone carrier a service provider because they provide
the platform for applications used in credit card or other payment
transactions for the customers of a first-party lender?143 Under DoddFrank, covered parties, including first-party lenders, “stand in the shoes
of their service providers” and may be liable for the misconduct of their
service providers.144 It is, therefore, crucial that institutions that fall
under the supervision of the CFPB, like first-party lenders, know which
service providers they must monitor for compliance to avoid liability for
UDAAP violations.145
V. LIMITS ON FIRST-PARTY LENDER REGULATION
The CFPB should extend and clarify regulation for third-party
debt collectors, but should not regulate first-party lenders in the same
rulemaking because of distinct differences between first-party lenders
and third-party debt collectors.146 The suggestion that several of the
See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67875.
Id. (requesting information on who the service providers in the industry are and
what types of services they perform, and what their relationship is to debt collectors).
140. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) §
1002(26)(A)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5481(26)(A)(1) (2012).
141. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67852.
142. VALERIE L. HLETKO & SARAH E. HAGER, BUCKLEY SANDLER LLP, WHICH ONE OF
US IS THE SERVICE PROVIDER? THE DODD-FRANK ACT’S INFINITE LOOP OF OVERSIGHT 1
(Aug. 9, 2013), available at http://www.buckleysandler.com/uploads/1082/doc/EmergingIssues_8-13.pdf.
143. Id. at 3.
144. Id. at 1.
145. See id. (discussing the liability of debt collectors for actions of their service
providers).
146. See, e.g., Sharp, supra note 39, at 11–12.
138.
139.
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proposed regulations will be extended to first-party lenders has caused a
stir in the debt collection industry, since the CFPB seems to ignore the
“old distinction between third-party collection and the collection of
Some first-party lenders have specifically
debts in-house.”147
questioned the CFPB’s statutory authority to regulate third-party debt
collectors and first-party lenders in the same way.148 Others have
voiced concerns over the practical implications of blanket regulation.149
A.

Statutory Limits on the Extension of Regulation—Dodd Frank,
the FDCPA and the FTCA

In response to the CFPB’s suggestion to extend debt collection
regulation to first-party lenders,150 some first-party lenders argue that
the CFPB lacks the authority for such a broad expansion, particularly if
the CFPB adopts the same regulatory language for first-party lenders as
already exists for third-party debt collectors under the FDCPA.151
During the comment period for the ANPR, several first-party lenders
argued that Congress did not intend for the FDCPA provisions to extend
to first-party lenders,152 and therefore, the statutory language should not
indiscriminately apply to both first-party lenders and third-party debt
collectors.153
While the FDCPA excludes first-party lenders, the CFPB has
regulatory authority over first-party lenders under Dodd-Frank.154
147. David Kaufman & Joanna M. Zdanys, United States: You Better Watch Out, You
Better Comply: Regulators Coming To Town (For First-Party Debt Collectors?), MORRISON
FOERSTER
LLP
ENFORCEMENT
BLOG
(Dec.
15,
2014),
http://www.moforeenforcement.com/2014/12/you-better-watch-out-you-better-complyregulators-coming-to-town-for-first-party-debtcollectors/?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign=ViewOriginal.
148. Sharp, supra note 38, at 11–12.
149. See, e.g., Nixon, supra note 39, at 2 (suggesting that first-party lenders like banks
are already heavily regulated and do not require further regulation).
150. The regulations are mostly related to unfair, abusive, and deceptive practices, and
modeled in a way that would be uniform with regulation of third-party debt collectors. See,
e.g., Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67870.
151. O’Neil et al., supra note 74, at 3, 36–37; see Reeves, supra note 123, at 2; see also
Wallace, supra note 129, at 2, 4.
152. See Wallace, supra note 129, at 7.
153. Id. at 3.
154. Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) §
1002(15), 12 U.S.C. § 5481(15) (2012) (describing financial service providers as any party
that extends credit, which would include first-party lenders).
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Dodd-Frank was not, however, meant to alter the scope of the
FDCPA,155 and FDCPA provisions are still limited to only third-party
debt collectors.156 Dodd-Frank established its own set of regulations
and guidance—including on UDAAPs—for financial service
providers.157 The CFPB must have a reasonable basis before qualifying
any act or practice as unfair, deceptive, or abusive under Dodd-Frank
and may not rely solely on public policy considerations.158 The CFPB
must consult with federal banking agencies in considering the
“prudential, market, or systemic objectives” of such agencies before
declaring an act a UDAAP.159 Dodd-Frank tasks the CFPB with
establishing “general policies” and “implementing the Federal consumer
financial laws through rules, orders, guidance, interpretations,
statements of policy, examinations, and enforcement actions.”160 The
CFPB has interpreted the UDAAP provisions of Dodd-Frank through
enforcement actions and through reliance on enforcement actions under
the FTCA,161 as well as the statutory definitions under Dodd-Frank and
the FTCA.162 It appears now that the CFPB may provide additional
guidance.163
The CFPB recently issued a bulletin to clarify UDAAP
definitions.164 In it, the CFPB provided examples of UDAAPs and
further defined deceptive practices.165 The examples of UDAAPs
included in the bulletin as falling within the scope of Dodd-Frank are,
among others, threatening any legal action that a debt collector is not
authorized to take, misrepresenting the nature or legal status of a debt,
or falsely stating that a communication is from an attorney.166 These
examples seem eerily similar to the prohibitions under the FDCPA.167
155.
156.

(2012).
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See O’Neil et al., supra note 74, at 36.
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) § 803(6), 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)

Dodd-Frank § 1031(a)–(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a)–(d).
Dodd-Frank § 1031(c)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1).
Dodd-Frank § 1031(e), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(e).
Dodd-Frank § 1012(a)(10), 12 U.S.C. § 5492(a)(10).
See MANUAL, supra note 92, at 1 n.2.
Id. at 1, 2 n.4.
163. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67848, 67869–74 (proposed Nov. 12,
2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006).
164. BULLETIN, supra note 92, at 1.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 5–6.
167. See, e.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) § 807(1)–(5), 15 U.S.C. §
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The CFPB may interpret Dodd-Frank provisions to mean exactly the
same thing as the FDCPA provisions and, in so doing, could take
advantage of the broad authority conferred by Dodd-Frank to implement
regulations directly at odds with the exclusion of first-party lenders
from the FDCPA. Dodd-Frank has given the CFPB broad authority to
interpret statutory provisions,168 however, and there is no valid statutory
objection to the CFPB defining and interpreting UDAAPs in a manner
that is consistent with the FDCPA.
However, UDAAPs have historically been defined through
enforcement and other agency actions.169 For example, unfair and
deceptive actions, which are prohibited under the FTCA, were intended
to be interpreted though individual actions, not specific statutory
examples, to provide flexibility and prevent the exploitation of
“loopholes.”170 The term “unfair” was found to be of a “ ‘class of
phrases which do not admit of precise definition, but the meaning and
application of which must be arrived at by what this court elsewhere has
called the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.’ ”171 The
FTCA definitions of unfair and deceptive practices have since been
defined based on such judicial actions,172 and the CFPB has relied on
the FTCA interpretations in its enforcement actions to date.173 While
abusive practices are a new term in consumer protection under DoddFrank, the CFPB has followed the same practice to define this term:
filing numerous enforcement actions that continue to provide guidance
and inform the application of UDAAPs in practice.174 Therefore, while
the CFPB may have the statutory authority to define and regulate the
practices of first-party lenders, it should do so through enforcement
1692e(1)–(5) (2012).
168. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) §
1021(c)(1)–(5), 12 U.S.C. § 5511(c)(1)–(5) (2012) (establishing, for example, the CFPB’s
authority to issue “rules, orders, and guidance implementing Federal consumer financial
law”).
169. See Farrell, supra note 48, at 23 (explaining that deceptive and unfair practices
were shaped by FTC litigation).
170. International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1072 (1984).
171. Id. (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931))
(internal quotation omitted).
172. See id. (“[T]he Commission has continued to refine the standards of unfairness in
its cases and rules.”).
173. See Farrell, supra note 48, at 29 (stating that the CFPB relied on the FTCA
deceptive acts definition).
174. See id. (listing examples of enforcement actions, like against Capital One in 2012).
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actions that can address specific circumstances. This approach is better
suited to first-party lenders because it would take into account their
unique position and relationship with consumers.
B.

Practical Reasons Why Additional Regulation of First-Party
Lenders is Unnecessary

First-party lenders argue that due to an inherently different
relationship between themselves and consumers, compared to thirdparty debt collectors, additional regulation remains unnecessary.175 Firstparty lenders, such as banks, are already heavily regulated, and limited
in the ways in which they can interact with consumers by numerous
other statutes.176 A few examples of additional regulation include the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, section 5 of the FTCA, the Community
Reinvestment Act, the Fair Lending Act, the Service Members Civil
Relief Act, and, of course, Dodd-Frank.177 Many first- party lenders are
also regulated by state statutes,178 which are often more stringent than
federal laws.179
First-party lenders further argue that the relationship between
first-party lenders and consumers makes additional regulation
superfluous.180 First-party lenders rely on strong relationships with
consumers that create a strategic incentive to maintain those good
customer relationships and provide fair treatment.181 Consumers are
able to choose their first-party lender, thus creating market pressure for
first-party lenders to attract consumers with a reputation of fair debt
collection practices.182 Furthermore, once a consumer, like a credit card
holder, is lost, it costs a first-party lender between $160 and $200 to
175. Wallace, supra note 126, at 4–5. For example, mini-Miranda warnings may scare
consumers, and make relationship more adversarial. Id.
176. Nixon, supra note 40, at 2.
177. Id.
178. Comment Letter from Bill Himpler, Exec. Vice President, Am. Fin. Serv. Ass’n, to
Consumer
Fin.
Prot.
Bureau
6
(Feb.
28,
2014),
available
at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2013-0033-0298.
179. See, e.g., Joel Stashenko, State Court Adopts Tighter Rules for Debt Collection,
N.Y. L. J. (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202670214756/StateCourt-Adopts-Tighter-Rules-for-Debt-Collection#ixzz3MeTQbwZm.
180. Nixon, supra note 40, at 3.
181. Id.
182. See Himpler, supra note 178, at 4 (finding that creditors are “still restrained by
their inherent motivation to protect their goodwill when collecting past due accounts.”).
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replace that consumer,183 and “a consumer may be debtor today, but 2
weeks from today he may be a customer again.”184 Thus, first-party
lenders are highly motivated to treat consumers fairly due to the
competitive dynamics of the marketplace.
One requirement that the CFPB takes into consideration for
regulation of deceptive practices is the mini-Miranda warning, a
required disclosure statement in a communication that explains that the
purpose of the communication is to collect a debt.185 The mini-Miranda
requirement is an essential regulation of third-party debt collectors, who
generally do not communicate with consumers other than to collect a
debt and have used unethical means to collect debts.186 First-party
lenders are concerned that forcing consumers to listen to such a standard
warning would frustrate the first-party lender relationship, since firstparty lenders communicate with consumers for a variety of reasons.187
Furthermore, according to some first-party lenders, requiring standard
warnings or disclosures of information when first-party lenders
communicate about a debt could create a “hostile and adversarial
environment,” thus closing off communication between creditors and
consumers and foreclosing opportunities for early resolution of debt
issues.188 The application of the mini-Miranda warning could become
cumbersome and counterproductive under such circumstances.
183. Id. at 5 (quoting Julie Austin & Vytas Kisielius, Confronting the Rise of First Time
Debtors: How to Collect Delinquencies from Otherwise Good Customers with Focus on
Long-Term
Relationships,
TSYS
(Summer
2010),
available
at
http://www.tsys.com/thoughtLeadership/ngenuityInAction/summer2010/).
184. Id. at 4 (quotation marks omitted).
185. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67848, 67864, 67872–73
(proposed Nov. 12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006). An example of a standard
mini-Miranda warning is “this communication is an attempt to collect a debt and any
information obtained will be used for that purpose.” Federal and State Mini-Miranda
(Jul.
15,
2013),
Disclosure
Fastfax
#1145,
ACA
INT’L
http://www.acainternational.org/fastfaxdoc-federal-and-state-mini-miranda-disclosurefastfax-1145-20345.aspx.
186. Tim Henderson, Comment, No Country for Voicemails: How the CFPB Can
Resolve a Paradox and Protect America’s Consumers from the World’s Fourth Oldest
Profession, 92 N.C. L. REV. 626, 654 n.161 (Jan. 2014) (citing Robert J. Hobbs, National
Consumer Law Center, Fair Debt Collection 291 (7th ed. 2011)) (including an example of
fake sweepstakes sent to consumers).
187. O’Neil et al., supra note 74, at 25–26 (explaining that consumers might get
frustrated with repeatedly listening to standard warnings in communications with first-party
lenders).
188. Id. at 25; see Mike Ferullo, CFPB Presses into Uncharted Territory as It Mulls
Debt Collection Rules for Banks, 26 Bankr. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1058 (July 31, 2014);
see also Wallace, supra note 129, at 2.

340

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 19

First-party lenders are also concerned with the effects that
additional regulation could have on their bottom line.189 Changing
procedures adds additional expenses, and Dodd-Frank specifically
requires the CFPB to take industry cost into account when formulating
new rules, including a “sound cost-benefit analysis.”190 First-party
lenders believe that more regulations could create a “disincentive for
some consumers to repay their obligations,”191 which in turn could
increase the cost of consumer loans.192 More regulation may also lead
to more debts being sold, since collection becomes more difficult,193 or
be so detrimental to consumers’ relationships with first-party lenders
that those lenders lose the incentive to build a positive relationship.194
While no evidence exists that new debt collection regulations
would restrict the availability of credit, or that it would increase the
costs to consumers,195 other concerns may be more valid. Recently,
Wells Fargo announced that it would sell around $8.5 billion in federal
student loans to Navient,196 a loan servicer recently spun off from Sallie
Mae.197 This announcement came only weeks after the CFPB report on
abusive conduct in student debt collection that included allegations
against Sallie Mae and Navient, for “allocating borrowers’
underpayments across multiple loans in a manner that maximizes late
fees; and [m]isrepresenting and inadequately disclosing in its billing
statements how borrowers could avoid late fees.”198
189. See Himpler, supra note 173, at 7 (expressing concern about “burdensome”
regulation).
190. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) §
1016b(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5496b(a)(1) (2012).
191. Comment Letter from Tom Wolfe, Exec. Vice President, Consumer Credit
Solutions, Wells Fargo Bank, to Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau 1 (Feb. 28, 2014), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2013-0033-0268.
192. Sharp, supra note 39, at 14–15; O’Neil et al., supra note 74, at 8.
193. Sharp, supra note 39, at 15.
194. Id.
195. Ripley, supra note 84, at 4–5 (finding no harmful impact on consumers after
increased debt collection regulation in North Carolina).
196. Wells Fargo to Sell $8.5 Billion in Federal Student Loans, REUTERS (Nov. 13,
2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/13/us-navien-studentloans-wells-faridUSKCN0IX1KL20141113.
197. Robert Farrington, How the Sallie Mae and Navient Split May Help Student Loan
(May
20,
2014),
Borrowers,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertfarrington/2014/05/20/how-the-sallie-mae-navient-splitmay-help-student-loan-borrowers/.
198. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CFPB STUDENT LOAN
OMBUDSMAN 19 (2014) [hereinafter STUDENT LOAN REPORT], available at
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Consumers may have additional reasons to be concerned about
the sale of their loans. In May 2014, Navient and Sallie Mae reached a
$97 million settlement with the federal government related to
allegations of unfair debt collection practices, including that they
“maximized late fees and failed to adequately disclose how consumers
could avoid the fees.”199 From October 2013 to September 2014,
consumers filed almost 2,000 complaints against Navient and Sallie
Mae.200 The sale of student loans demonstrates that increased
regulatory scrutiny can cause first-party lenders to abdicate debt
collection to third-party debt collectors or other loan buyers, but it also
undermines the argument that first-party lenders are committed to their
consumers and want to maintain positive consumer relationships.201
C.

More Appropriate Measures of Regulation

While several practical reasons exist for why first-party lenders
should not be regulated in the same manner as third-party debt
collectors, there are clear concerns over the debt collection practices of
many first-party lenders.202 As the CFPB points out, there is lingering
concern that consumers who are unable to pay their bills are not the
kind of customer with whom a first-party lender would want to
“maintain a long-term business relationship”203 that would negate any
incentive to treat consumers fairly. First-party lenders point out that
their debt collection practices are focused on consumer relationships,

http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201410_cfpb_report_annual-report-of-the-student-loanombudsman.pdf.
199. Alan Ziebel & Andrew Grossman, Sallie Mae, Navient Reach Student-Loan
J.
(May
13,
2014),
Settlement
with
U.S.
Government,
WALL ST.
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303851804579560053304272542.
200. STUDENT LOAN REPORT, supra note 193, at 7.
201. See, e.g., Emily Driscoll, When Student Loans Are Sold: What Borrowers Should
Know, FOXBUSINESS.COM (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.foxbusiness.com/personalfinance/2012/10/10/when-student-loans-are-sold-what-borrowers-should-know/ (discussing
reasons, like disclosure requirements, that lead lenders to sell loans, which can lead to
payment complications for consumers).
202. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT:
CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 2013 15 (2013), [hereinafter FDCPA ANNUAL REPORT], available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_March_FDCPA_Report1.pdf (finding that
first-party lenders were the cause of 22,353 consumer complaints related to debt collection
in 2012).
203. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67848, 67849 (proposed Nov. 12,
2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006).
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and include “polite notes” and reminder phone calls from bank
employees who personally know the consumer.204 According to firstparty lenders, employees check to see if there may be “something in the
customer’s situation that has changed which may justify consideration
of an adjustment on the borrower’s repayment schedule.”205
In light of the number of consumer complaints,206 this
description rings hollow. While there are certainly more incentives for
first-party lenders to maintain a relationship with returning consumers,
debt collection is not always what it should be.207 Particularly with the
advent of new technology, there are several methods of debt collection,
such as collection efforts through social media that will require new
regulation for both third-party debt collectors and first-party lenders.208
Further, even though all FDCPA provisions should not be
indiscriminately extended and applied to first-party lenders, any conduct
that violates the UDAAP provisions of Dodd-Frank should be addressed
by the CFPB or other regulatory agencies, as in the cases of DriveTime
or Freedom Stores.209 In addressing these consumer concerns, however,
the CFPB should continue to utilize enforcement actions to define
UDAAP provisions, instead of relying on overbroad industry regulation.
While individual actions may delay a concise UDAAP definition, it is
more adaptable to individual circumstances. And if the CFPB does,
ultimately, choose to establish more concrete regulations for first-party
lenders, it should do so in a separate rulemaking that addresses firstparty lenders’ unique position and concerns.
VI. CONCLUSION
The CFPB has a long road ahead before it can issue a final
rule. It has taken an important step towards regulating third-party
debt collectors and changing the perception of the debt collection
industry.211 In doing so, however, the CFPB has neglected to properly
210

Himpler, supra note 178, at 4–5 (internal citation omitted).
Id.
FDCPA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 197.
See, e.g., Aubin, supra note 33 (alleging harassing conduct by Bank of America
related to collection of mortgage loans).
208. See Lopez, supra note 120, at 923, 923–24.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 1–9.
210. Ferullo, supra note 188, at 1059.
211. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67848, 67848 (proposed Nov. 12,
204.
205.
206.
207.
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distinguish between first-party lenders and third-party debt collectors.212
Even though debt collection statutes recognize the need to treat the two
sectors of the industry differently,213 the CFPB seems intent on creating
a blanket rule for UDAAP provisions that would treat first-party lenders
and third-party debt collectors the same. The CFPB may have the
authority to do just that under Dodd-Frank,214 but it may not be wise to
do so. Approaching regulation of first-party lenders through
enforcement actions, as it has done in the past, may be a better solution
to addressing valid consumer concerns regarding first-party debt
collection practices. By doing so, the CFPB would be able to address
the practical concerns that first-party lenders have raised in a flexible
manner. Overall, while the CFPB is to be commended for its efforts to
provide more consumer protection while taking industry concerns into
consideration, it must ensure that it does so discriminately.
REBECCA PLETT

2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006).
212. See, e.g., Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67870 (suggesting
expansion of the same definition of abusive conduct to both third-party debt collectors and
first-party lenders).
213. See, e.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) § 803(6), 15 U.S.C. §
1692a(6) (specifically excluding first-party lenders from regulation).
214. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) §
1012(a)(10), 12 U.S.C. § 5492(a)(10) (giving the CFPB freedom to interpret consumer
financial laws).

